Imshin's blog has photos from the site of Friday's pigua.
I don't have much to say about these things anymore.
6 hours ago
... Abu Mazen's electoral scheme may very well represent such a shift in thinking, a recognition that the most effective martyrs are not those who blow themselves up in cafes, but those who die while trying to care for their communities.
I should thank you for increasing traffic at my site by "reviewing" my comments regarding the Palestinian elections. You might note, however, that it was a post about the Palestinian elections, not a broader post about political violence, innocent victims, etc. You have no way of determining what my judgements are, or whether I am "capable" of acknowledging your truths. I may be, or I may not be, but you certainly have no way of knowing based on the little that you selected here.
My blog rarely ventures off topic, and mainly focuses on discourse and the structuring effects of a particular kind of Islamist discource in Arab parliamentary practice (since this is the subject of my Ph.D. dissertation, and the reason for my frequent travel to Beirut and Sana'a). When it does go off topic, I certainly expect to "take fire", but I would hope that you see my post for what it was - a discursive analysis of Abbas' electoral campaign materials and campaign promotion, and not a broader manifesto on the Palestinian-Israeli crisis.
Further, I found your assertions about what I would or would not say to my "hosts" to cross a line and violate your own rule on ad hominem attacks. First, you have no idea whether or not I have been "hosted" by Israel, as well, and whether that may have influenced by thinking on the Middle East. Second, you really have no idea what my relationship to Egypt is. As it happens, my husband took a job here to facilitate my regional travel, and neither of us do any research here or have an serious connection - we're just plain old expats. So to infer that my thoughts or words are couched because I am in some way endebted to some kind of aggregated concept of Arab "hosts" was both presumptious and unfairly dismissive.
And as for the quote, which I believe you took out of context (but will allow readers to determine for themselves), the quote that preceeded it in the original post was by a friend who is a rabbi at a large NY congregation and visited us in Cairo en route to Jerusalem. It's his opinion, after years of working with Palestinian policymakers, and one which I share. You should, I would imagine, be more concerned about him then you are about me, since he stands a chance at disrupting your "base."
What can I tell you? Even a piss-pot state like Palestine is referred to as "dawlat falestiin" "The State of Palestine". "wilaaya" in the singular is used for a local state, as far as I know. Certainly, Arafat would never refer to it as "wilayat falestiin", particularly since it has the overtones of a local autonomous district subject to a greater empire, and would I think imply a degree of subordination to a greater body. My Arabic dictionary defines it as
"sovereign power, sovereignty; rule, government. administrative distrcit
headed by a vali, vilayet (formerly under the Ottonman Empire); provence (= division of a country, e.g. Tunisia, Algeria); sovereign state (in a federal
union)." etc.
The United States is called in Arabic alwilayaat almuttaHida - wilayaat is plural of wilaya, state (the -aat ending is like feminine plural -ot in Hebrew) and muttaHida means united, from root waHad, 'one' (= Hebrew
me'uHadot).
The Arabic "ayy-" is etymologically equivalent to the element "ey-" in Hebrew words such as "eyfo", "eyzo", "eylu" or Biblical "ayyekka" where are you. etc. It means "which", "whatever". Hence "ey + po" (which+here > where), "ey + ze" (which+this > which one).
ayy in Arabic can which which or whatever, hence any or every. ayy wilaaya means "any state" (eyze medina) or "whichever state". The Slate notes the inconsistency in the English translation, but there isn't such a difference really. (Whichsoever state).
I hope this helps.
“I think the reaction is an understandable one by President Putin,” ... “The United Nations charter does give the right of self-defence and the UN itself has accepted that an imminent or likely threat of terrorism certainly entitles any state to take appropriate action.
From the Jpost report: A German Green member of the European Parliament, Ilka
Schroder, had earlier complained of "hard lobbying" by the commission to prevent
the inquiry. This, she said, included a whispering campaign to taint the group
as an "Israeli front" determined to block aid to Arafat.
...The real meaning of the court's decision, then, is to delegitimize not Israel's right to self-defense but its right to claim any territory, even for self-defense, over the Green Line.The point about Thomas Friedman's "evolution" is interesting because it illustrates how the often monolithic perspective of the "elites" gets shaped. If the Palestinians demand something for long enough and violently enough, sympathy and understanding will erupt, and in not too long the press and the European governments will fall into line.
The danger of that decision is to create the legal groundwork for an imposed solution that would force Israel back to the 1967 borders, even without a peace agreement - Yasser Arafat's dream scenario.
And so the war Israel needs to fight now isn't so much over the decision itself but its premise: that all land beyond the 1967 border belongs by right to Palestine.
...
In determining that Israel has no legitimate claim to any territory it won in 1967, including, presumably, Jewish neighborhoods built in east Jerusalem, the court has, in effect, overturned UN resolution 242, the basis of the land for peace formula, which doesn't refer to Israel's return of "the territories" but merely "territories."
...
IN DETERMINING the route of the fence, Israel needs to be guided by four considerations. The first is security. If topography, say, dictates that the fence be built on a hill rather than in a valley, then that is the army's decision. Security is also the logic for walling off Jerusalem and preventing the city from being "shared" with - and destroyed by - an armed Palestinian authority.
The second consideration is demography: ensuring there are as few Palestinians as possible on our side of the fence.
The third is also demography-related: ensuring as many settlers as possible on our side of the fence. In the absence of a peace agreement, only isolated settlements caught on the Palestinian side of the fence should be uprooted.
The fourth is psychological: preventing the Palestinians from perceiving our withdrawal as a victory for terrorism. In losing part of the West Bank, the Palestinians and the Arab world generally will understand that terrorism has a price.
If those considerations are followed, about 10 percent of the West Bank will be incorporated into Israel by the fence.
Until Ehud Barak proposed ceding 92% of the territories at Camp David and then 96% at Taba, most observers took for granted that Israel wouldn't return to the 1967 borders. One plan popular on the Israeli Left envisioned a Palestinian state on only 89% of the territories. Tom Friedman was even less generous. Before Camp David, he wrote a column called "75 for 75" - by which he meant that 75% of Israelis would support withdrawal from 75% of the territories. At the time, Friedman considered that formulation a reasonable basis for ending the conflict.
Two competing views of the 1967 borders have now emerged within the international community. Along with the Hague decision is the American position, formulated by President Bush and endorsed by Congress (with a few exceptions, such as John Kerry, who didn't show up for the Senate vote). According to the new Bush Doctrine, Israel will not be expected to withdraw to the 1967 borders. And Palestinian refugees will return only to a Palestinian state.
That doctrine undermines the two key elements of the Palestinians' long-term strategy to undermine Israel's viability: first, forcing Israel back to the Green Line, and then overwhelming the Jewish state with refugees - through international pressure on Israel to increase the number of refugees it willingly accepts and through an invisible "return" of Palestinians slipping across the border and settling in Arab Israeli communities, as tens of thousands have already done in recent years.
The fence puts a brake on both those processes. It marks the security line that may well become Israel's political border. And it prevents the infiltration of Palestinian refugees into Israel.
That is the real reason why Palestinian leaders see the fence as a disaster and why they have mobilized their politicized allies on the international court to stop it. And that's precisely why Israel must cling to the fence and its current route.
...What HRW did do was substitute the voices of alleged victims for universal human rights standards.
If leading international human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights/Human Rights First, chose not to apply those standards when anti-Semitism stared them in the face, there is little reason to believe their claims that they now apply those standards to Israel in the same way they apply them to every other state.
...For those of my readers who politically are somewhere on the Left, here's what the Right thinks of you: Deep down, you have no red lines. You'd rather go down as the morally spotless victim than the morally encumbered victor. You'll sell your birthright not for a mess of potage, but for less: the retrospective pity of future generations.
I know this because it reflects my own suspicions. Because when Rabin and Peres and Barak spoke of red lines, the Right knew they weren't really red lines - and they were right. Because Beilin won't shut up about how close he was at Taba. Because I watched Avraham Burg sucking up to Yasser Abd Rabbo at Davos by cracking anti-Israeli jokes and pleading with his hosts to be invited to future conclaves of the great and good....
Incidentally, remember all the fuss about whether the Geneva Accord conclusively renounced the right of return? As though the fact that the Palestinian signatories claimed it didn't wasn't a plain demonstration that it didn't?
So now Yossi Beilin's counterparts are all on CNN screaming that the right of return may never be given up. Is there any question remaining about what ratifying that treaty would have brought?
As we arrived at our meeting the chief Durban representative of Human Rights Watch, advocacy director Reed Brody, publicly announced that as a representative of a Jewish group I was unwelcome and could not attend. The views of a Jewish organization, he explained, would not be objective and the decision on how to vote had to be taken in our absence. Not a single one of the other international NGOs objected.Update: Reed Brody responds here, but doeson't contradict Bayefsky's basic points:
....In Durban, and its year-long run-up, we campaigned to ensure that the WCAR would be about more than the Middle East. ..... A great achievement of the WCAR process was the unprecedented mobilization of victims of racism from communities around the world, such as the so-called untouchables of South Asia, the Roma of Europe, and blacks in Latin America.
With over 3,000 victims groups present in the pre-WCAR forum of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), organizations like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International had limited ability to moderate the language of chapters for the NGO declaration. Each chapter was drafted by the affected community, including not only Palestinians but also such groups as Tibetans, Kurds, and Dalits. Many of these chapters were factually supported, powerful documents, but others were not. Our refusal to participate in the voting on the statement and its chapters, and our failed attempt to cast the document as a collection of the "voices of the victims" rather than as a text endorsed by all, was intended precisely to avoid giving a stamp of approval to all parts of the document.
Bayefsky, however, claims that we "said nothing" as the final NGO statement was put together on September 2, 2001, and lent legitimacy to its inflammatory statements about Israel. In fact, as the Post (and virtually every other newspaper in the world) reported on September 3, "The New York-based Human Rights Watch condemned the resolution." The Post quoted me as saying, "Israel has committed serious crimes against the Palestinian people, but it is simply not accurate to use the word genocide and wrong to equate Zionism with racism."
Prior to the declaration's adoption I personally spent hours trying to persuade Arab and Palestinian colleagues to amend this and other language. ....
The declaration, adopted by a majority of the 3,000 delegates from 44 regions to the World Conference's Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) forum -- a broad-based summit of groups from around the world involved in human rights issues -- shocked Jewish participants, and many walked out of the meeting.
Some other international human rights groups who were part of the NGO forum, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, moved to distance themselves from the declaration.
...
Reed Brody, executive director of the New York-based Human Rights Watch, said: "Israel has committed serious crimes against Palestinian people but it is simply not accurate to use the word genocide and to equate Zionism with racism ... it is now a matter of damage control."
We are not soft on terrorism. We have checked out every allegation that has been brought to our attention. We have not been able to establish a direct link between our money and terrorism. We welcome the fact that the parliamentarians wanted to look at it. There isn't any form of financial assistance that is 100 percent risk-free. That is as true in the Palestinian territories as it is in Cornwall
Arbel says that the main difference between the Israelis and the Palestinians was their attitude toward the deceased: "I was astonished to see that in most of the Palestinian homes there is a photograph of the child's body, sometimes with the bullet in the head. Can you imagine framing a picture of your child who has been shot?"Seems to me that this reflects both martyr-reverence and a desire to keep the anger and drive for revenge alive.
What do you think about the idea of annexing Umm al-Fahm to the Palestinian Authority?
"Absolutely not. Ninety-three percent of the city's residents are against that, and I am one of them. This is our home, we are citizens like everyone else, and we have it good here."
What's so good here for you? What about all the complaints of persecution, oppression and discrimination?
"It's all true, as you know. Yet our situation here is still far better than it would be if we were in an Arab state. I admit it. I also say it in talks abroad. It's a fact. That doesn't mean that there is nothing to improve. There's plenty."
Meanwhile, leading Israeli conservatives speak openly about a “transfer” or mass deportation of the remaining Arab population, and boast that this is no more than what they began doing in 1947/1948."leading Israeli conservatives"?? As I've often noted, you'll have to go out to the Kahanists or the far-right of the settlement movement to find "speaking" like that.
I am not the first person to remark upon the distressing state of Israeli public life, increasingly dominated by zealots and demagogues; the subject is commonplace in Israeli writing, as Amos Elon notes. It is mainly Israel's American defenders who seem blithely unaware of this state of affairs. Lenin used to describe Bolshevism's foreign admirers—fellow-traveling progressives who resolutely heard and saw no ill in their promised land—as "useful idiots."Judt has not visited here (his observations are so way off and anyway he would have mentioned it). He can't be reading much of the Israeli media either (even Haaretz) if he thinks that "public life is increasingly dominated by zealots and demagogues". So where are these ideas (and venom) coming from?
The Israeli initiators of the Geneva Accord are guilty of multiple outrages. They've summoned a campaign of international pressure against their own democratic government, hampering its diplomatic maneuverability. They've undermined the legitimacy of the Sharon government while strengthening the legitimacy of Yasser Arafat's. They've lied to the public about the accord's supposed renunciation of the right of return, when in fact the accord reaffirms it. They've negotiated away Israel's most basic assets, not least its right to defend itself, and gotten vague Palestinian promises in return. And, hardly surprising, they allowed the Geneva signing ceremony to be overtaken by a blame-Israel atmosphere without offering any defense in response.
But perhaps their greatest damage is domestic. In the past three years, Israeli society has managed two extraordinary achievements. The first is to withstand a planned, systematic terror campaign whose purpose was to break our will and slowly erode our viability. Shortly after the outbreak of the Terror War in September 2000, Ehud Barak warned that, in a contest of wills between two societies, the loser will be the one who blinks first. Now, with Geneva, a part of Israeli society has blinked.
No less serious is Geneva's erosion of Israel's second great achievement: the marginalization of both the ideological Right and Left and the end of the no-win debate between them. The combined effects of the first and second intifadas on Israeli consciousness was to convince the majority that both Greater Israel and Peace Now were delusions. And so, arguably for the first time since the 1967 Six Day War, most Israelis were no longer viewing the territories through an ideological prism of wishful thinking but facing reality, however grimly, on its own terms.
"The document does not promise a full and collective return for millions of Palestinians, but it also does not cede this right. On the contrary: the proposed time frame for the solution of the refugee problem is five years, while the time frame for the Israeli retreat from the Palestinian lands [sic], evacuation of settlements and completion of installing Palestinian sovereignty on its lands according to the maps - which are more important than the texts - is only three years."So Zakot is saying that the PA will first get everything that it wants in the West Bank/Gaza, so it will be able hold out and stay maximalist. And don't think that they wouldn't.
We don't have to call it anti-semitism or Jew-hatred. Those words are so intertwined with modern history that their defining qualities have been pushed aside. But "irrational fear of and attribution of malicious intent to the only country in the world that is dominantly Jewish, and Jewish influences in other countries" covers it. It highlights the sinister part without strawman-friendly diversions like whether this is hate, or whether Hitler would have approved.
It had been agreed beforehand that a message from Arafat would not be read aloud at the ceremony - but at the last moment the PA delegation demanded and threatened, and the Swiss hosts gave in. The message from Arafat, considered to be the father of modern-day terrorism, stated, "While Israel continues to build a Berlin Wall, we hold an olive branch.
There are yellow steel gates in the barbed wire [at Jayyous] but they are closed. Farmers are busy making phone calls, some are going to see the Israeli military to demand that the gates be opened. Eventually, soldiers arrive. Harvesting is a family affair so the soldiers face a crowd of men, women and children. What they do is this. First they collect all their identity papers.
Then they call the people out one by one. Today they have decided that no male between the ages of 12 and 38 will be allowed on his land. Also, no woman will be allowed unless she is over 28 and married. So the majority of the farmers - men, women and teenagers - stand at the gate, the Israeli soldiers and the barrier between them and the harvest that is their sustenance and income for the coming year.
Two men set off to try and find a way of infiltrating their own land. The rest make their way back to the village hall. On the mayor's desk lie some 600 permits that appeared in the village this morning. They are issued by the Israeli authorities and made out to individual farmers. About half of them are in the names of people who can't use them: babies, infants, a couple of men who have been in Australia for 15 years. But that is not the point. The point is that the people know that if they use these permits they are implicitly accepting their terms: three months' access with no recognition of any rights to the land. They suspect that after three months Israel will start playing games with them. Permits like these were one of the mechanisms by which their parents and grandparents were dispossessed of their land in 1948. What should they do? Use the permits and try to salvage their crops and deal with the rest later? Boycott the permits and starve?
The next day a Jewish Israeli woman gives me a copy of the military order on which the permits are based. It names the West Bank land now trapped between the barrier and Israel's borders the "Seam Zone". It states that the people who have the right to be in the Seam Zone without permits are Israelis or anyone who can come to Israel under the Law of Return. That is, any Jewish person from anywhere in the world. But in this district alone, 11,550 Palestinians have their homes in the Seam Zone. "It is Nuremberg all over again," she says.
The Palestinians of Jubara were alarmed when Israeli soldiers began posting notices on telephone poles and at checkpoints around their small West Bank village.
....
The notices told of an unprecedented new order: everyone must apply for a special permit to remain in Jubara -- the village has about 300 residents. The notices did not specifically mention expulsion, but Palestinian officials and villagers said they understand this to be the implied threat.
In a week when the Sharon government announced negotiations with the new Palestinian government for a second hudna, or cease-fire, and when the text of the "Geneva Accord" appeared as a pamphlet with our morning newspapers, it is useful to remind ourselves what we've learned about the conflict over this last bitter decade. And that is that the Oslo-era notion of a comprehensive peace needs to be wiped from our lexicon.
Instead, we should conceive not of resolving the conflict but of managing its intensity. A hudna isn't merely a means to an end but - at least for the foreseeable future, and possibly for this generation - the end itself.
There are several compelling reasons why a comprehensive peace is now unattainable. The first is the near-total absence, among mainstream Palestinians and the Arab world generally, of the notion that Jewish sovereignty over any part of this land is legitimate.
....
Many of us who initially supported Oslo assumed that a reciprocal realization had occurred among Palestinians. In fact, no such transformation of Palestinian consciousness occurred. The opposite: One of Oslo's many ironies is that, by entrusting the education of a generation of Palestinians to Arafat's pathological regime, the Palestinian people are far less emotionally and ideologically ready for peace than they were before the Oslo process began.
...
At the same time, we need to recognize the fluidity of this moment and stay open to new possibilities. In balancing the contradictory insights of politics and faith, our challenge is one of timing: how to avoid premature hope that could once again lead us to disastrous political initiatives, while not missing sudden openings for change.