Week before last T. and I visited the Northern Negev (around Nahal Eshkol) while it was in bloom. Photos later (maybe).

UPenn doctoral candidate Stacey is currently in Yemen (being on the receiving end of impromptu stonings, cheerily identifying herself as part of a "third gender", and breezily ignoring US State Dept advisories).

But now she weighs in on the situation in Lebanon:

I'm still in Sana'a, but wrapping up here with the intention of heading to Beirut by April 1st, so I've been contacting friends about sublets and whatnot. In one particularly chilling response, a fellow scholar/friend writes:


As for things here, they're a bit too exciting for my taste. Gangs of shebab are riding around the streets at night from both the opposition and loyalist camps. Several people were shot over the weekend in Achrafieh/Gemayzeh....Meanwhile, there are very scary rumors about Ketaeb being in contact with Israel and plotting things for here. And this comes from both the Israeli press and rumors here. I really don't trust them, or Aoun. The Christian militia youth are spoiling for a fight, even though they'd be creamed. I think they feel Christians lost the war and they missed their glory days by not fighting in their own war - a very dangerous combination.

Great. Her advice? Buy a refundable ticket.

You really have to love those academics don't you? The pro-Syrian elements are the "loyalists" and the pro-democracy demonstrators are the "opposition" who travel around in "Shebab". And of course they have us sinister Israelis down pat - always pulling the strings behind the scenes aren't we?

I'm sure Stacey doesn't agree, disagree, or have a stance about her scholar friend's nomenclature or speculations of conspiracy; she just finds them chilling unlike the warm people in Yemen. But I'm fairly certain that the global media would jump on the opportunity to tell the story if things were as bad there as she seems to suspect.

Update: Stacy responds to my sarcasm with a dose of her own, and writes that

Tal's basic objection seemed to be to my posting of a colleague's on-the-ground view of the evolving situation in Lebanon, and failure to condemn her use of the terms "Opposition" instead of "Pro-Democracy."This, of course, puts her in league with all but, say, Fox News...including many within the Opposition itself!

No.

I made two observations:

a) Stacey brooked no enthusiasm for the apparent emergence of an Arab trend towards democracy (an enthusiasm shared well beyond the Fox News viewership), and used conspiciously antiseptic language that masked the sense that there might be anything positive going on.

b) Stacey's colleague made conspiratorial insinuations about Israelis pulling the strings behind the Lebanese political scene. These remarks were apparently such a commonplace that she doesn't even notice them (or notice my noticing them) or perhaps even find them worthy of skepticism. You'd be interested to know that Israelis don't like to be viewed as diabolical.

Imshin's blog has photos from the site of Friday's pigua.

I don't have much to say about these things anymore.

Disappointing concert by Roy Campbell's Pyramid Trio at the Tel Aviv Jazz Festival last night. Rhythm section William Parker/Hamid Drake were terrific, but Campbell's trumpet playing was sloppy.

And it got really strange when Campbell horribly and inexplicably began to "sing" some very makeshift lyrics for his compositions (something that he hasn't done much before according to Google).

This blog might still come back to life at some point. Life here is much less interesting these days, and there are so many blogs doing a good job of highlighting things from the Israeli media.

Some Americans and Europeans try so hard not to be judgmental. This woman writes from Cairo where she is researching her PhD:

... Abu Mazen's electoral scheme may very well represent such a shift in thinking, a recognition that the most effective martyrs are not those who blow themselves up in cafes, but those who die while trying to care for their communities.

Well that would just be great ... maybe only the less effective martyrs would try to blow up Israelis in cafes. She wouldn't actually say to her hosts that the cult of martyrdom is bad, just that it's not effective for youngsters to kill themselves (just like ISMers who talk about Palestinian "suicide", Israeli victims aren't even on her conceptual radar).

She's also not able to acknowledge that any current Palestinian moderation is at least partly due to the fact that the intifada failed to secure any gains ie. that the Israelis won.

Update: Stacy responds in the comments

I should thank you for increasing traffic at my site by "reviewing" my comments regarding the Palestinian elections. You might note, however, that it was a post about the Palestinian elections, not a broader post about political violence, innocent victims, etc. You have no way of determining what my judgements are, or whether I am "capable" of acknowledging your truths. I may be, or I may not be, but you certainly have no way of knowing based on the little that you selected here.

My blog rarely ventures off topic, and mainly focuses on discourse and the structuring effects of a particular kind of Islamist discource in Arab parliamentary practice (since this is the subject of my Ph.D. dissertation, and the reason for my frequent travel to Beirut and Sana'a). When it does go off topic, I certainly expect to "take fire", but I would hope that you see my post for what it was - a discursive analysis of Abbas' electoral campaign materials and campaign promotion, and not a broader manifesto on the Palestinian-Israeli crisis.

Further, I found your assertions about what I would or would not say to my "hosts" to cross a line and violate your own rule on ad hominem attacks. First, you have no idea whether or not I have been "hosted" by Israel, as well, and whether that may have influenced by thinking on the Middle East. Second, you really have no idea what my relationship to Egypt is. As it happens, my husband took a job here to facilitate my regional travel, and neither of us do any research here or have an serious connection - we're just plain old expats. So to infer that my thoughts or words are couched because I am in some way endebted to some kind of aggregated concept of Arab "hosts" was both presumptious and unfairly dismissive.

And as for the quote, which I believe you took out of context (but will allow readers to determine for themselves), the quote that preceeded it in the original post was by a friend who is a rabbi at a large NY congregation and visited us in Cairo en route to Jerusalem. It's his opinion, after years of working with Palestinian policymakers, and one which I share. You should, I would imagine, be more concerned about him then you are about me, since he stands a chance at disrupting your "base."

I will try to reply later, but most broadly:

1. In this particular blog post (and the others that I scanned) you are adopting the "Islamist discourse" rather than merely analyzing it. Certainly you do not seem to be analyzing it in a critical manner. Dialog is admirable, but not when it requires adopting a "discourse" that "disadmits" things like moral objection to attacks on Israelis.

2. I don't have a "base". Also I'm not "concerned" with you. Like many blogs I just write what's on my mind.

3. I do apologize for assuming that your presence in Cairo was related to your PhD work when it is in fact during your travels to Beirut and Sanaa that you do your research. I don't see this a relevant to my central point. That said, I do regret the final sentence of my original post which dealt with broader political issues.

Today already feels like the longest day ever since I started reading blogs.

I'm concerned about what it would mean for Israel if Kerry wins. My primary impressions of Kerry revolve around his apparent lack of clear positions, his reputed reliance on polling, and his tilts to the far left of his party. To me this recalls Ehud Barak, who managed to do a fair amount of damage to this country.....

I emailed Pajamahadeen Arabic language expert "Ribbity Frog" for his opinion on the interpretation of the Osama video and whether it threatens states that vote for Bush. He responds:

What can I tell you? Even a piss-pot state like Palestine is referred to as "dawlat falestiin" "The State of Palestine". "wilaaya" in the singular is used for a local state, as far as I know. Certainly, Arafat would never refer to it as "wilayat falestiin", particularly since it has the overtones of a local autonomous district subject to a greater empire, and would I think imply a degree of subordination to a greater body. My Arabic dictionary defines it as

"sovereign power, sovereignty; rule, government. administrative distrcit
headed by a vali, vilayet (formerly under the Ottonman Empire); provence (= division of a country, e.g. Tunisia, Algeria); sovereign state (in a federal
union)." etc.

Slipping back into a more demure academic posture, he adds:

The United States is called in Arabic alwilayaat almuttaHida - wilayaat is plural of wilaya, state (the -aat ending is like feminine plural -ot in Hebrew) and muttaHida means united, from root waHad, 'one' (= Hebrew
me'uHadot).

The Arabic "ayy-" is etymologically equivalent to the element "ey-" in Hebrew words such as "eyfo", "eyzo", "eylu" or Biblical "ayyekka" where are you. etc. It means "which", "whatever". Hence "ey + po" (which+here > where), "ey + ze" (which+this > which one).

ayy in Arabic can which which or whatever, hence any or every. ayy wilaaya means "any state" (eyze medina) or "whichever state". The Slate notes the inconsistency in the English translation, but there isn't such a difference really. (Whichsoever state).

I hope this helps.

I called a friend about going to see Omri Mor/Omer Avital at the dumpy but pleasant Artel tomorrow night. He said he's not sure because his unit is on high alert due to Arafat's situation.

This is interesting because my friend is a civilian employed by the security forces in a technical area.

A lot of the media here (especially Jpost) reads as if Arafat had died already.

There's some weird stuff on Google News. But not too much about Kassam missiles or Peter Hansen.

This comprehensive post by Dave at Israellycool does what the MSM should be doing: evaluate the competing claims of the IDF and UNRWA chief Peter Hansen.

Hansen, of course, has shown that he has zero compunctions about making provably false statements in the knowledge that he won't get checked up on.

The "aid workers" who were attacked by masked men near Hebron belong to the "Christian Peacemaker Team", which is associated with the ISM. So take anything that they say with a grain of salt.

A quick googling shows that someone coincidentally named Kim Lamberty was placed on probation in connection with some Mumia-protest in the US.

The first column by new Jpost editor David Horovitz is here. Horovitz sounds windy and self-important. Jpost will likely begin tilting left, which leaves Israel without a major right-of-center media outlet.

So Russia is talking about preemptive attacks on terrorist bases, and British Foreign Minister Jack Straw says:

“I think the reaction is an understandable one by President Putin,” ... “The United Nations charter does give the right of self-defence and the UN itself has accepted that an imminent or likely threat of terrorism certainly entitles any state to take appropriate action.

The ICJ claimed that there is no right to self-defence from a threat not associated with a foreign state. Amazing hypocrisy - you expect that from Russia, but it's particularly notable coming from the UK.

The PA's media center is describing the Hamas stronghold attacked yesterday by the IDF as a "summer camp" (link).

These pictures of the security barrier were taken from highway 6 (ie. the Israeli side) near Netanya and Kfar Saba. This is an area where a couple of kilometers separate large West Bank villages from the Israeli suburbs and towns north of Tel Aviv. The suicide bombers that entered Netanya generally came from Tulkarm, and in June 2003 a 7-yr. old travelling in a car on highway 6 was gunned down near Qalqilya.



The one above is from the Qalqilya/Kfar Saba area. From the highway there are a few observation towers visible and this is one of them.



The picture above is from around Netanya/Tulkarm.



This one is actually from fairly close up. Near Tulkarm the Israeli side of the barrier extends a couple of meters above a grassy hill next to the highway.

Serious roadblocks around the city today. Rte. 443 south was backed up for a long long way as they seemed to be stopping every vehicle.

It's interesting that Al-Aqsa Brigades claimed responsibility for yesterday's bombing which killed only Palestinians. You'd think they'd want to keep quiet about it.

Google news search indicates that the European media has almost zero interest in the evidence that the PA used EU aid to finance suicide bombings.

From the Jpost report: A German Green member of the European Parliament, Ilka
Schroder, had earlier complained of "hard lobbying" by the commission to prevent
the inquiry. This, she said, included a whispering campaign to taint the group
as an "Israeli front" determined to block aid to Arafat.

So the new path of the fence (following the decision of the Israeli supreme court) goes within 100 meters of Mevasseret Zion (report).  Mevasseret is a large suburb of Jerusalem just off the TA highway.    One time I went off-road biking from Jerusalem to the reservoir area (which is very close to Mevasseret) and our experienced off-road biking guide/wire service journalist told us that we are actually quite close to the Green Line and that sometimes shepherds from nearby Arab villages come by.

According to an article in Jpost print edition, the security fence as currently constituted will incorporate 15000 West Bankers on the Israeli side.  The figure of 237,000 mentioned by the ICJ includes East Jerusalemites who hold Israeli residency.

Terrific article by Yossi Klein Halevi on the ICJ opinion.  Some excerpts (emphases added):

...The real meaning of the court's decision, then, is to delegitimize not Israel's right to self-defense but its right to claim any territory, even for self-defense, over the Green Line.

The danger of that decision is to create the legal groundwork for an imposed solution that would force Israel back to the 1967 borders, even without a peace agreement - Yasser Arafat's dream scenario.

And so the war Israel needs to fight now isn't so much over the decision itself but its premise: that all land beyond the 1967 border belongs by right to Palestine.

...

In determining that Israel has no legitimate claim to any territory it won in 1967, including, presumably, Jewish neighborhoods built in east Jerusalem, the court has, in effect, overturned UN resolution 242, the basis of the land for peace formula, which doesn't refer to Israel's return of "the territories" but merely "territories."

...

IN DETERMINING the route of the fence, Israel needs to be guided by four considerations. The first is security. If topography, say, dictates that the fence be built on a hill rather than in a valley, then that is the army's decision. Security is also the logic for walling off Jerusalem and preventing the city from being "shared" with - and destroyed by - an armed Palestinian authority.

The second consideration is demography: ensuring there are as few Palestinians as possible on our side of the fence.

The third is also demography-related: ensuring as many settlers as possible on our side of the fence. In the absence of a peace agreement, only isolated settlements caught on the Palestinian side of the fence should be uprooted.

The fourth is psychological: preventing the Palestinians from perceiving our withdrawal as a victory for terrorism. In losing part of the West Bank, the Palestinians and the Arab world generally will understand that terrorism has a price.

If those considerations are followed, about 10 percent of the West Bank will be incorporated into Israel by the fence.

Until Ehud Barak proposed ceding 92% of the territories at Camp David and then 96% at Taba, most observers took for granted that Israel wouldn't return to the 1967 borders. One plan popular on the Israeli Left envisioned a Palestinian state on only 89% of the territories. Tom Friedman was even less generous. Before Camp David, he wrote a column called "75 for 75" - by which he meant that 75% of Israelis would support withdrawal from 75% of the territories. At the time, Friedman considered that formulation a reasonable basis for ending the conflict.

Two competing views of the 1967 borders have now emerged within the international community. Along with the Hague decision is the American position, formulated by President Bush and endorsed by Congress (with a few exceptions, such as John Kerry, who didn't show up for the Senate vote). According to the new Bush Doctrine, Israel will not be expected to withdraw to the 1967 borders. And Palestinian refugees will return only to a Palestinian state.

That doctrine undermines the two key elements of the Palestinians' long-term strategy to undermine Israel's viability: first, forcing Israel back to the Green Line, and then overwhelming the Jewish state with refugees - through international pressure on Israel to increase the number of refugees it willingly accepts and through an invisible "return" of Palestinians slipping across the border and settling in Arab Israeli communities, as tens of thousands have already done in recent years.

The fence puts a brake on both those processes. It marks the security line that may well become Israel's political border. And it prevents the infiltration of Palestinian refugees into Israel.

That is the real reason why Palestinian leaders see the fence as a disaster and why they have mobilized their politicized allies on the international court to stop it. And that's precisely why Israel must cling to the fence and its current route.

The point about Thomas Friedman's "evolution"  is interesting because it illustrates how the often monolithic  perspective of the "elites" gets shaped.  If the Palestinians demand something for long enough and violently enough, sympathy and understanding will erupt, and in not too long the press and the European governments will fall into line.

Good analysis of the ICJ deliberations here.  Particularly interesting are the shamelessly unobjective remarks by the Egyptian judge, and the British judge's offhand remark that the ICJ didn't actually consider the issue seriously.